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Completion Report
Project Number: 46014-002
Loan Number: 3127
Grant Number: 0386
July 2019
Solomon Islands: Provincial Renewable Energy Project
This document is being disclosed to the public in accordance with ADB’s Access to Information
Policy.
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency unit – Solomon Islands dollar (SI$)
| | |
| | At Appraisal At Project Completion |
| | (1 March 2014) (15 October 2018) |
SI$1.00 | = | $0.14 $0.128 |
$1.00 | = | SI$7.30 SI$7.81 ABBREVIATIONS |
ADB COL DSC | – – – | Asian Development Bank Commissioner of Lands design and supervision consultant |
FIRR | – | financial internal rate of return |
km | – | kilometer |
kW | – | kilowatt |
kWh MMERE | – – | kilowatt-hour Ministry of Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification |
PMU | – | project management unit |
SDR | – | special drawing right |
SIEA SIG | – – | Solomon Islands Electricity Authority Solomon Islands Government |
WACC | – | weighted average cost of capital |
NOTES
(i) The fiscal year (FY) of the Government of Solomon Islands, Solomon Islands Electricity Authority ends on 31 December. “FY” before a calendar year denotes the year in which the fiscal year ends, e.g., FY2018 ends on 31 December 2018.
(ii) In this report, “$” refers to United States dollars.
Vice-President | Ahmed M. Saeed, Operations 2 |
Director General | Ma. Carmela D. Locsin, Pacific Department (PARD) |
Director | Olly Norojono, Energy Division, PARD |
Team leader | Anthony Maxwell, Principal Energy Specialist, PARD |
Team members | Dalcy Ilala, Senior Country Coordination Officer, PARD Vinoo Jose, Senior Operations Assistant, PARD Teresita Leono, Project Analyst, PARD |
In preparing any country program or strategy, financing any project, or by making any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area in this document, the Asian Development Bank does not intend to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
CONTENTS
Page
BASIC DATA i
- PROJECT DESCRIPTION 1
- DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 1
- Project Design and Formulation 1
- Project Outputs 2
- Project Costs and Financing 4
- Disbursements 4
- Project Schedule 5
- Implementation Arrangements 5
- Technical Assistance 6
- Consultant Recruitment and Procurement 6
- Gender Equity 6
- Safeguards 7
- Monitoring and Reporting 7
- EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE 7
- Relevance 7
- Effectiveness 8
- Efficiency 8
- Sustainability 8
- Development Impact 8
- Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency 8
- Performance of the Asian Development Bank 9
- Overall Assessment 9
- ISSUES, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 10
- Issues and Lessons 10
- Recommendations 10
APPENDIXES
- Design and Monitoring Framework 12
- Project Cost at Appraisal and Actual 14
- Project Cost by Financier 15
- Disbursement of ADB Loan and Grant Proceeds 17
- Contract Awards of ADB Loan and Grant Proceeds 18
- Chronology of Main Events 19
- Project Implementation Schedule 20
- Status of Compliance with Loan Covenants 21
BASIC DATA
A. Loan/Grant Identification
- Country Solomon Islands
- Loan/Grant number and financing source 3127 (COL) / 0386 (ADF)
- Project title Provincial Renewable Energy
Project
- Borrower/Recipient Solomon Islands/Ministry of
Finance and Treasury
- Executing agency Ministry of Mines, Energy and
Rural Electrification
- Amount of loan/grant $6,000,000 / $6,000,000
- Financing modality Project Loan and Grant
B. Loan/Grant Data
- Appraisal
– Date started 17 June 2013
– Date completed 28 June 2013
- Loan/Grant negotiations
– Date started 27 February 2014 – Date completed 28 February 2014
- Date of Board approval 12 May 2014
- Date of loan/grant agreement 16 June 2014
- Date of loan/grant effectiveness
– In loan/grant agreement 14 September 2014
– Actual 16 June 2015
– Number of extensions 2
- Project completion date
– Appraisal 31 March 2022
– Actual 15 October 2018
- Loan/grant closing date
– In loan/grant agreement 31 March 2022
– Actual 15 October 2018
– Number of extensions None
- Financial closing date
– Actual 15 October 2018
- Terms of loan
– Interest rate 1.5%
– Maturity (number of years) 32
– Grace period (number of years) 8
- Terms of relending (if any)
– Interest rate 4% p.a. over $6,000,000 and 1%
p.a. for $4,500,000
– Maturity (number of years) 20
– Grace period (number of years) 7
– Second-step borrower Solomon Islands Electricity
Authority (SIEA)
ii
- Disbursements
- Dates
Initial Disbursement 24 January 2017 | Final Disbursement27 September 2018 | Time Interval 20 months |
Effective Date 16 June 2015 | Actual Closing Date15 October 2018 | Time Interval 40 months |
- Amount ($ million)
Category | Original Allocation (1) | Increased during Implementation (2) | Canceled during Implementation (3) | Last Revised Allocation (4=1+2–3) | Amount Disbursed (5) | Undisbursed Balance (6 = 4–5) |
Civil Works | 1.90 | - | - | 1.90 | 0.00 | 1.90 |
Capacity Building | 1.50 | - | - | 1.50 | 0.00 | 1.50 |
Equipment | 0.40 | - | - | 0.40 | 0.00 | 0.40 |
Project Management Contingencies | 1.20 1.00 | - - | - - | 1.20 1.00 | 0.35 0.00 | 0.85 1.00 |
Total | 6.00 | | | 6.00 | 0.35 | 5.65 |
C. Proje | ct Data | | | | | |
1. Project cost ($ million) | | | | |
Cost | Appraisal Estimate | Actual |
Foreign exchange cost | 8.50 | 0.43 |
Local currency cost | 6.50 | 0.00 |
Total | 15.00 | 0.431 |
| | | | | | | |
1Includes SIEA $88,504 expenditure as per 2017 Audited Project Financial Statement and ADB disbursements of $345,689.11.
2. Financing plan ($ million)
Cost Appraisal Estimate | Actual |
Implementation cost Borrower financed 3.00 | 0.09 |
ADB financed | 12.00 | 0.35 |
Total implementation cost1 | 15.00 | 0.43 |
Interest during construction costs Borrower financed | - | - |
ADB financed | - | - |
Other external financing | - | - |
Total interest during construction cost2 | - | - |
1Actual costs (rounded $0.43 million) SIEA $88,504 expenditure and ADB disbursements of $345,689.11. 2No interest costs as no construction took place and no loan proceeds were disbursed. 3. Cost breakdown by project component ($ million) | |
Component | Appraisal Estimate | Actual |
A. Base Costa - Fiu River hydropower plant
- Distribution grid extension
- Capacity building
- Project Management
Subtotal (A) B. Contingencies | 8.70 0.60 1.70 1.40 12.40 2.60 | 00.35 |
Total (A+B) | 15.00 | 00.35 |
| | | |
a Appraisal estimate includes taxes and duties of $1.7 million.
Source: ADB. 2014. Report and Recommendation to the President, Solomon Islands, Provincial Renewable Energy Project, Manila.
iii
- Project schedule
Item | Appraisal Estimate | Actual |
Date of contract with consultants (i) Azimuth Surveys: Cadastral Survey (ii) Azimuth Surveys: Topographic Survey (iii) Saman Corp: Supervision Consultants (iv) Golder Associates: Geotechnical Investigation | April 2014 April 2014 July 2014 July 2014 | 29 February 2016 26 April 2016 18 May 2016 7 October 2016 |
- Project performance report ratings
Implementation Period | Single Project Rating |
From 16 June 2015 to 30 September 2019 | | On Track |
From 1 October 2015 to 31 December 2015 | | Potential Problem |
From 1 January 2016 to 31 March 2016 | | On Track |
From 1 April 2016 to 30 June 2016 From 1 July 2016 to 30 September 2016 From 1 October 2016 to 31 December 2016 | | Potential Problem Potential Problem Potential Problem |
From 1 January 2017 to 31 March 2017 | | On Track |
From 1 April 2017 to 30 June 2017 From 1 July 2017 to 30 September 2017 From 1 October 2017 to 31 December 2017 | | Actual Problem Actual Problem On Track |
From 1 January 2018 to 31 March 2018 | | On Track |
From 1 April 2018 to 30 June 2018 From 1 July 2018 to 30 September 2018 From 1 October 2018 to 15 October 2018 | | On Track Potential Problem On Track |
D. Data on Asian Development Bank Missions | | | |
Name of Mission | Date | No. of Persons | No. of Person-Days | Specialization of Membersa |
Reconnaissance | 6-10 May 2013 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Loan Fact Finding | 17-28 June 2013 | 4 | 35 | a,b,b,c |
Loan Negotiations | 25-28 February 2014 | 2 | 4 | a, f |
Review | 15-19 September 2014 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Review | 16-20 March 2015 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Review | 27-31 July 2015 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Review | 19-30 October 2015 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Review | 28 January 2016 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Review | 24-28 July 2017 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Special Loan Administration | 30 January–3 February 2017 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Midterm Review Mission | 13-17 November 2017 | 2 | 5 | a, f |
Project completion review | 25 February–3 March 2019 | 3 | 9 | a, d, e |
a = energy specialist/team leader, b = safeguard specialists, c = young professional, d = project analyst, e = senior operations assistant, f = resident mission representative.
I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
1. Rationale. The project rationale was to increase renewable energy generation and energy access in the underserved provincial capital of Auki, Malaita Province. While Malaita Province has about 25% of the national population, it only has about 2% of total electricity generation capacity, and only about 3% of the population of Malaita has access to grid-connected power. Power generation in Auki is currently 100% diesel generation, which has contributed in high generation costs contributing to high tariffs. The high cost of electricity and the limited reach of the distribution grid are slowing economic growth in the provincial centers, including Auki, and impacting agriculture and tourism in particular.
2. The project was to assist the state-owned power utility Solomon Islands Electricity Authority (SIEA) to construct Fiu River hydropower plant, adjacent to Auki, and extend the distribution grid to Auki peri-urban households. This was to benefit the economy by (i) reducing fossil fuel imports; (ii) lower the cost of power generation, which will ease the pressure on power tariffs and thereby reduce commercial and household expenditure; (iii) improve energy security, and (iv) minimize tariff volatility by partially converting the national grid to renewable energy. The use of renewable energy also reduces greenhouse gas emissions, which contribute to global warming. Externally tendered operation and maintenance contracts, including capacity development of SIEA technical staff, was to improve the quality of power supply (by reducing outages) in Auki, and encourage economic development. The grid extension was to directly benefit new peri-urban customers by (i) replacing kerosene lighting with a cheaper form of energy, thereby freeing household expenditure; (ii) enabling household income generation; (iii) improving children’s education; and (iv) reducing indoor health and safety issues associated with burning kerosene.
3. Impact, Outcome and Outputs. The impact of the project was increased economic activity in Auki, Malaita Province. The outcome was increased supply of more reliable and cleaner power to Auki, Malaita Province. The outputs of the project were (i) Fiu River hydropower plant put into operation by SIEA, (ii) extension of distribution grid by SIEA, (iii) capacity building undertaken for implementing agency and project beneficiaries, and (iv) the Project Management Unit renders efficient project management services.
II. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
4. The design and monitoring framework and the actual achievements are in Appendix 1.
A. Project Design and Formulation
5. The outcome of the Project was increased supply of more reliable and cleaner power to Auki, Malaita Province. At the time of approval, the project outcome was aligned with ADB’s country program and national sector frameworks and development strategies. The project was included in ADB’s country partnership strategy, 2012–2016 and the country operations business plan (2014−2016) at the request of the Solomon Islands Government (SIG).[1] The project was closely aligned with Solomon Islands’ National Development Strategy, 2011–2020, which prioritized development of reliable and affordable power supply to urban centers from renewable energy and the expansion of access to electricity. The project was specifically included as a
priority investment in the Solomon Islands National Infrastructure Investment Plan.[2] It also supported Solomon Islands’ National Energy Policy Framework, 2007 and the draft National Energy Policy Framework 2013, which both prioritize development of renewable energy.[3] The project also supported the draft Solomon Islands Renewable Energy Investment Plan, 2013.[4]
6. The project design was initially selected through a site screening process under TA-7329 Promoting Access to Renewable Energy in the Pacific,[5] and then through a site-specific design and due diligence process under a separate project preparation technical assistance ($1 million).6 Government and SIEA showed strong ownership of the project. Hydropower was assessed to be the least cost technical option for conversion of the Auki grid from diesel generation to renewable energy. Extensive community consultation was undertaken by the Provincial Government prior to ADB’s engagement, and ADB conducted additional extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders, including landowners.
7. Multiple financing modalities were assessed during project preparation including project loan, multi-tranche financing facility and sector loan. The project financing modality was selected as the project was a single site, with a relatively short construction period and did not suit multitranche or long-term sector loan modalities. This modality is considered appropriate. Project design was considered relevant at appraisal and is still considered relevant. ADB supports development of renewable energy in Solomon Islands and is currently supporting two separate renewable energy projects: (i) Solar Power Development Project and (ii) Tina River Hydropower.
B. Project Outputs
8. Background. The project was approved on 12 May 2014, the loan agreement was signed on 16 June 2014 and the project was declared effective on 16 June 2015. The extended period between signing of loan agreement and effectiveness was due to delays in signing the subsidiary loan agreement between SIEA and SIG, which was a loan effectiveness condition. This was the first such subsidiary loan agreement signed between SIEA and SIG and extended negotiations were required to agree on repayment obligations.
9. Initial Works. Following effectiveness on 16 June 2015, the Project Management Unit was established within SIEA and initial site preparation works undertaken, including topographical and cadastral surveys, geotechnical analysis and preliminary technical design. However, due to ongoing land acquisition delays, the project did not proceed to procurement of the Fiu River Hydropower Engineering, Procure, Construct (EPC) contract.
10. Malaita Provincial Government. The Malaita Provincial Government (MPG) had conducted significant land acquisition works prior to ADB financing being requested, as part of the provincial government de-risking of pre-identified priority investment sites. This included assigning a dedicated lands representative, identification of landowners, and multiple consultation meetings. Two Memoranda of Agreement were signed between landowners and the MPG to allow the project assessment to proceed (21 May 2013 and 14 August 2013).
11. Fiu River Hydropower site. The project did not require physical relocation or loss of income for landowners but required about 11 hectares of customarily owned land. The project design was run-of-river so did not include a reservoir (only low diversion weir) and no impacts were expected upstream or downstream of the hydropower plant. Land acquisition and compensation were pursued as a negotiated agreement between SIG and customary landowners. Land acquisition was voluntary.
12. Resettlement Plan. As part of the resettlement plan preparation, ADB conducted significant consultation, including (i) socio-economic survey, (ii) 3 focus group discussions (total 75 persons), and (iii) 4 consultation meetings (total 175 persons).[6] A Resettlement Plan was prepared and approved prior to Board approval which detailed consultations undertaken and issues discussed with effected persons. During project preparation a review was undertaken of alternative land acquisition models and lessons learnt from other large infrastructure projects in Solomon Islands. The Project was categorized as Involuntary Resettlement: Category B and Indigenous Peoples: Category C.
13. Land Acquisition Process. Land acquisition followed the national process mandated under the Land and Titles Act, including consultation with landowners at regular intervals. Land acquisition also followed the process in the Resettlement Plan. The process included:
(i) A lands acquisition officer was appointed by the Commissioner of Lands (COL).
(ii) Project was advertised and call for submissions from land claimants issued. The lands acquisition officer conducted wide consultations in both Auki and Honiara to ensure potential land claimants knew of the proposed project.
(iii) Malaita Provincial Government and SIEA held parallel public consultations with potential land claimants to discuss the ongoing process and any land claimants concerns.
(iv) Land acquisition officer assessed land claimants and determined landowners in accordance with national requirements.
(v) A three-month appeal period expired on 14 May 2014.
(vi) A Certificate of No Appeal was issued.
(vii) The Commissioner of Lands (COL) then advised the Surveyor General to undertake the site survey (boundary of land to be leased).
(viii) A valuation study was undertaken by the Valuation Unit, Ministry of Lands, Housing and Survey. SIEA advised land claimants that financial support was available for undertaking independent land evaluation.
(ix) Funding was provided to the land claimants who undertook an independent valuation.
14. After the appeals period had expired, an additional claimant lodged an objection to the landowner identification process. The claimant was not identified as a landowner under the original survey and consultations and did not raise an opinion during the public submissions period. The Malaita Magistrates’ Court in Auki reviewed the claim on 10 March 2015, sought advice from the Attorney General, and subsequently overturned the objection. The claimant then took the case to the High Court in Honiara which after repeated delays heard the case on 28 November 2016. Despite repeated enquiries from various levels of Government, the High Court did not deliver a finding. COL would not proceed with the lease agreement while there were outstanding court cases.
15. SIEA met with all land claimants and advised that if land acquisition was not settled the project would not proceed. In parallel, SIEA began assessing alternative sites for renewable energy supply to Auki Township. On 19 October 2017, the Minister of Finance and Treasury (Honorable John Maneniaru) requested ADB to revise the project site from the Fiu River Hydropower to the Kwainamoro Solar Plant site. ADB tentatively agreed to this proposal because the proposed change in scope was consistent with the original projects impact and outcome.
16. Kwainamoro Solar Plant. SIEA screened numerous sites near Auki for a solar farm and selected Kwainamoro site (3 hectares) as it was freehold (not customary land), land trustees supported its use as a solar farm and the site was adjacent to transmission infrastructure. SIEA commenced site assessment (financed through counterpart financing), including topographic and cadastral surveys and landowner consultation. ADB procured 4 individual consultants on behalf of SIG (financed through the project) to prepare feasibility studies and undertake due diligence of the site. However, prior to mobilization and preparation of a major change in scope for ADB management consideration, ADB required SIG to finalize land acquisition. The identified site was privately held by 5 Trustees, however following the death of one trustee, the remaining trustees and the family of the deceased trustee could not agree on a revised land ownership agreement, and could therefore not proceed with the lease to SIEA. SIEA met with the landowners on several occasions to keep them informed of the process and advise them of deadlines for making the land available. Due to extended delays in land acquisition at the Kwainamoro Solar Farm site, the Ministry of Finance and Treasury (MoFT) requested ADB to cancel the financing for the project (letter dated 28 August 2018).
17. The key performance indicators for the all project outputs were therefore not met as the Fiu Hydropower plant as well as distribution grid extensions were not constructed. Consequently, associated capacity building activities were also not completed as these were related to operation of the proposed infrastructure. This is summarized in Appendix 1. There were no major changes in scope processed.
C. Project Costs and Financing
18. At financial close, a total of $434,193.11 had been spent on the project, including $88,504 expenditure by SIEA (as per 2017 Audited Project Financial Statement) and ADB disbursements of $345,689.11. There were no major contracts signed for the project (due to ongoing land acquisition delays) and no cost-overruns. Project cost at appraisal and actual is included in Appendix 2. The project was financially closed on 15 October 2018 and $5,410,944.12 was cancelled.[7]
D. Disbursements
19. A total of $345,689.11 was disbursed from Grant 0386 (total $6,000,000) for initial project preparation activities. No funding from Loan 3127 was disbursed. Overall, 2.9% of ADB financing was disbursed. The original disbursement projections at the time of project effectiveness were realistic from a technical perspective, however the projections of time required for land acquisition was ultimately unrealistic. The projected and actual disbursement is included in Appendix 3.
E. Project Schedule
20. The schedules at appraisal and as implemented are in Appendix 6. The schedule delays were due to the following:
(i) Signing of Subsidiary Loan Agreement. The project was approved on 12 May 2014 and became effective on 16 June 2015. The delay between approval and effectiveness was due to protracted negotiations between SIEA and MoFT over the subsidiary loan agreements. This pushed the schedule back 13 months.
(ii) Consultants recruitment. There were delays in engaging design and supervision consultants as (i) SIEA was reluctant to proceed with recruitment prior to effectiveness due to uncertainty over repayment obligations, and (ii) change in site location required additional topographical surveys prior to commencement of design work.
(iii) Land acquisition. Land acquisition was relatively on-schedule in relation to the appraisal schedule, until an out of appeals period objection was received. Significant delays were then experienced while court cases were deliberated, which ultimately resulted in cancellation of the project with no major contracts awarded.
21. The original closing date was 31 March 2022, however the actual closing date was 15 October 2018. The early closing date was due to cancellation of the project at the request of the Government. There were no extensions in loan or grant closing date.
F. Implementation Arrangements
22. Implementation arrangements designed at appraisal were applied and were considered adequate. No major changes were made to the implementation arrangements. The Ministry of Mines, Energy and Rural Electrification (MMERE) was the executing agency and SIEA was the implementing agency.
23. A Project Management Unit (PMU) was established within SIEA to implement the project, including (i) project manager (engineer), (ii) finance officer (part time), (iii) land acquisition officer (part time), and (iii) administrative assistant (part time). The PMU was supported by a design and supervision consultancy package. SIEA also provided project support through the SIEA outstation manager in Auki, who managed relationships with the Government and stakeholders in Malaita Province. A Project Steering Committee was established and held three meetings in 2016, however due to ongoing land acquisition delays, none of these meetings were held in 2017 or 2018.
24. The PMU structure was adequate for activities undertaken under the Project, including procuring and administering consultants and small works packages for initial site investigations and surveys, progress reports and preparation of withdrawal applications. Some minor delays were experienced as the SIEA team lead role was initially not full time, however a full time position was subsequently allocated. The PMU lands acquisition officer had significant experience in land acquisition in Solomon Islands, and provided valuable oversight over the lands acquisition officer appointed by COL.
25. SIG showed strong ownership in attempting to sort out the land acquisition issue, including the following:
(i) Both SIEA and the MPG met with the land claimants to attempt and facilitate an out- of-court agreement.
(ii) The Attorney General approached the Registrar of the High Court to request a timely delivery of the finding from the relevant judge.
(iii) Permanent Secretaries from both MoFT and MMERE approached the High Court to request for an explanation regarding the delays in delivering a finding.
G. Technical Assistance
26. Project development was originally supported by TA-7329 Promoting Access to Renewable Energy in the Pacific[8]. The regional TA supported sector reform, capacity building and project screening in Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu. In Solomon Islands the TA screened renewable energy sites and completed pre-feasibility studies for five prioritized hydropower sites. This formed the basis for selection of the Fiu River Hydropower site for subsequent investment. The TA closure report concluded the TA as successful.[9] The TA also developed the Solomon Islands national renewable energy plan, which formed part of the updated national Energy Policy.
27. Project development was then supported by a project preparation technical assistance (PPTA) Provincial Renewable Energy Project (formerly Outer island Renewable Energy Project).[10] The PPTA carried out due diligence and successfully supported due diligence and technical design of the Fiu River Hydropower Plant. The PPTA also conducted extensive social and environment safeguard assessments.
H. Consultant Recruitment and Procurement
28. The recruitment of the design and supervision consultants (DSC) was completed in accordance with ADB’s Guidelines on the Use of Consultants (2017, as amended from time to time), by using the quality and cost-based selection method with a weighting of 90:10. At the request of SIEA, ADB procured the consultants on their behalf. SIEA signed a lump sum contract with SAMAN on 18 May 2016. SAMAN completed preliminary design work. SIEA considered the work undertaken by SAMAN to be adequate. Due to ongoing land acquisition delays, a stop work notice was issued to SAMAN on 6 July 2017 and termination notification sent 27 September 2017. No major issues were encountered during the procurement or implementation of the DSC contract.
I. Gender Equity
29. The Project was classified as effective gender mainstreaming (EGM). A Gender Action Plan (GAP) was prepared and approved as a linked document to the RRP on 12 May 2014. As the project did not proceed to procurement of civil works contacts or construction, the gender performance targets set out in the GAP were not achieved.
J. Safeguards
30. Environment. The project was assigned category B for environment following ADB’s Safeguard Policy Statement (2009). The main environmental impacts identified in the initial environmental examination were related to construction impacts from the powerplant, powerlines and access roads. The only site activities conducted were topographical and geotechnical surveys. As such, environmental monitoring and reporting did not commence.
31. Involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples. The Project was assigned category B for resettlement and category C for indigenous peoples following ADB’s Safeguard Policy Statement (2009). A resettlement plan was prepared, approved by ADB and uploaded on ADB’s website. Since detail design was not completed, the resettlement plan was not revised. The PMU included a land acquisition specialist. The design and supervision consultants also included national and international social safeguard specialists. An indigenous peoples’ plan was not required.
K. Monitoring and Reporting
32. The project included 42 covenants (Appendix 8) which were complied with, or were not due, except the following:
(i) Project Website (Financing Agreement, Schedule 5): Partially complied with. Project webpage was set up, however basic data on procurement of small topographic and geotechnical contracts were not uploaded.
(ii) Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement (Financing Agreement Schedule 5): Not complied with. The inability to complete land acquisition ultimately led to project cancellation.
33. All covenants stipulated in the financing agreements were assessed relevant and appropriate. No covenants were required to be modified during project implementation as the loan/grant was cancelled. Compliance with safeguard monitoring and periodic progress reporting covenants was deferred due to lack of progress on detail design and construction activity.
34. The audited project financial statements (APFS) were submitted as required. APFS for Fiscal Years 2015 and 2016 were deferred due to lack of disbursement. APFS for Fiscal Year 2018 (due on or before 30 June 2019) was submitted on time. There is a discrepancy between the disbursement recorded under APFS for Fiscal Year 2017 and the total amount disbursed. The unaccounted amount ($68,343) is accounted for in APFS for Fiscal Year 2018.
III. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE
A. Relevance
35. The project’s design and DMF are rated as relevant at appraisal and financial close. Power generation in Auki, the provincial capital of Malaita Province, is 100% diesel generation, which has contributed in high generation costs resulting in high tariffs. Malaita Province has exceptionally low access to the electricity grid. Malaita Province has about 25% of the national population, however it only has about 2% of total electricity generation capacity, and only about 3% of the population of Malaita has access to grid-connected power. The proposed project was to assist the state-owned power utility SIEA to construct Fiu River hydropower plant, adjacent to Auki, and extend the distribution grid to Auki peri-urban households. This was to benefit the economy by (i) reducing fossil fuel imports; (ii) lower the cost of power generation, which will ease the pressure on power tariffs and thereby reduce commercial and household expenditure; (iii) improve energy security, and (iv) minimize tariff volatility by partially converting the national grid to renewable energy. The grid extension was to directly benefit new peri-urban customers by (i) replacing kerosene lighting with a cheaper form of energy, thereby freeing household expenditure; (ii) enabling household income generation; (iii) improving children’s education; and (iv) reducing indoor health and safety issues associated with burning kerosene. This design remains relevant.
36. The project loan modality is considered appropriate. The project experienced significant delays due to land acquisition delays. While these delays were not immediately foreseeable, a more conservative project design may have included advanced land acquisition completed prior to Board approval.
B. Effectiveness
37. The project is rated as ineffective as the expected outcomes were not achieved. The outputs were not achieved as the project did not proceed due to land acquisition delays. The project was classified as effective gender mainstreaming (EGM). Gender benefits were ineffective as the gender action plan indicators were not met.
C. Efficiency
38. The project is rated as inefficient as the project economic benefits will not be realized.
D. Sustainability
39. The project is rated as unsustainable as the project financial benefits will not be realized as the project did not proceed to construction phase.
E. Development Impact
40. The development impact of the project is rated as unsatisfactory as the development impact will not be realized. The targets identified in the contribution to the ADB results framework will not be achieved.
F. Performance of the Borrower and the Executing Agency
41. The implementing agency, SIEA, showed strong ownership over the project. SIEA allocated (i) dedicated staff, (ii) counterpart financing for consulting, legal and travel fees relating to land acquisition costs, and (iii) provided dedicated office space and communications for consultants. However, there were delays between loan/grant signing and effectiveness due to protracted negotiations between MoFT and SIEA over allocation of responsibilities in the subsidiary loan agreement. The steering committee met regularly and provided oversight and guidance on key issues. MPG showed early strong ownership over the land acquisition process. SIEA allocated dedicated land acquisition staff and facilitated dialogue with landowners. However, once the land dispute entered the courts, the executing agency, MPG and SIEA had no authority to influence and expedite the court decision. As a result, failure to manage the land acquisition issue ultimately required early closure of the Project. The executing agency complied with ADB safeguard and auditing requirements, although these were minimal due to the limited implementation progress. The overall performance of the executing agency is rated less than satisfactory, primarily due to the extended delays in achieving effectiveness and due to extended land acquisition issues which could not be resolved.
G. Performance of the Asian Development Bank
42. Project design is considered adequate and included innovative design components to address country specific capacity constraints, including extended 3-year operation and maintenance contracts built into project financing. ADB provided adequate support to the Project Management Unit, including (i) training for the finance manager for preparation and submittal of WA’s, (ii) training for technical staff, and (iii) delegated procurement of design and supervision consultants on behalf of SIEA. ADB conducted advance land acquisition activities ahead of Board approval and conducted numerous safeguard reviews to assess progress on land acquisition, both by PARD safeguard specialists and independent consultants. Apart from the executing and implementing agencies, ADB kept regular communication with other relevant stakeholders, including development partners (to share lessons learnt), and MPG. ADB maintained flexibility in design scope, including a willingness to assess an alternative site, once it was clear the land acquisition issues at Fiu River were intractable.
43. ADB fielded 12 missions from 2013 to 2019, including project preparation missions, loan fact finding, loan negotiations and review missions. This is considered adequate. No review missions were held in 2018 as project progress was on hold while the High Court deliberated the land dispute case, however the Project team (including country office staff) were in constant communication with key stakeholders to gauge progress.
44. The overall performance of ADB is rated satisfactory. Although the project ultimately failed due to land acquisition delays impacting the Project, the resolution of the court case which prevented land acquisition, was beyond ADB control. Land acquisition due diligence at the time of project design was considered adequate.
H. Overall Assessment
45. The project is assessed with an overall rating of unsuccessful given that the outcome and outputs were not achieved.
Overall Ratings
Criteria | Rating |
Relevance | Relevant |
Effectiveness | Ineffective |
Efficiency | Inefficient |
Sustainability | Unsustainable |
Overall Assessment | Unsuccessful |
Development impact | Unsatisfactory |
Borrower and executing agency | Less than satisfactory |
Performance of ADB | Satisfactory |
ADB = Asian Development Bank.
Source: Asian Development Bank.
IV. ISSUES, LESSONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Issues and Lessons
46. Land Acquisition. Despite significant resources dedicated to supporting the land acquisition process, and advance land acquisition action being undertaken prior to Board approval, the Project ultimately did not proceed due to land acquisition delays. Land acquisition is a major barrier to infrastructure development in Solomon Islands. In order to reduce the risk of delayed or cancelled projects in the future, pipelined energy projects could consider (i) requiring completion of land acquisition prior to Board consideration, and (ii) only selecting project sites that do not have existing land disputes and non-customary sites wherever possible.[11]
47. Elite capture of land compensation payments. Current local clan structures and national land acquisition processes encourage maneuvering by clan leaders to maximize compensation payments, which can delay or block project implementation. Models are currently being tested where compensation is paid directly to individual clan members, which may partially remove the disincentives for clan leaders to delay or block project progress.[12] This also partially avoids formal recognition of clan leadership structures, which is traditionally fluid. These models were assessed during project preparation but considered to have excessive transaction costs for small projects such as the Fiu River Hydropower. This may be considered for future projects.
48. Additional Lessons. The following issues and lessons should also be considered:
(i) Attendance fees. During initial landowner consultations, the Government paid attendance fees which created an incentive to hold more meetings and delay decisions. Clear directives should be given to Government not to pay attendance fees and explore options for more inclusive consultations without inducing any cash payment.
(ii) Levels of compensation. Initial landowner dialogue should include independent advice on indicative compensation package sizes. This will manage inflated landowner perceptions of project benefits which impacts inter-clan coordination and overall compensation negotiation.
49. Effectiveness Conditions. The effectiveness condition that required signing of the subsidiary loan agreement (SLA) between the power utility and MoFT resulted in significant delays from Board approval to project effectiveness. This was the first SLA for SIEA and MoFT.
B. Recommendations
50. The following is recommended:
(i) Land acquisition is completed prior to proceeding to Board approval for greenfield energy sector projects on customary land in Solomon Islands.14 It should be recognized that this will delay processing schedules and require upfront allocation of additional technical assistance to support land acquisition.[13]
(ii) Consideration is given in future energy projects in Solomon Islands to models currently being tested where compensation is payed directly to individual clan members.
(iii) The SLA is signed prior to Board approval for energy sector projects where the power utility has no experience in signing SLA with the Government. This will reduce the risk of delays between loan signing and effectiveness.
51. Covenants. No revisions to the covenants are recommended as the project has been cancelled.
52. Further action or follow-up. No further actions or follow up is recommended.
53. Timing of the project performance evaluation report. Since the Project did not proceed to construction, a project performance evaluation report is not considered relevant.
Appendix 1
DESIGN AND MONITORING FRAMEWORK
Design Summary | Performance Indicators and Targets | Project Achievements |
Impact Increased economic activity in Auki, Malaita Province | Increase in SIEA business customers by 20% in Auki by August 2020 compared with June 2014 baseline of 335 Increase in registered businesses in Auki by 20% by August 2020 compared with June 2014. | Not achieved Not monitored as project did not proceed |
Outcome SIEA has increased supply of more reliable and cleaner power to Auki, Malaita Province | Renewable energy generation increased as a percentage of Auki power generation, from 0% in June 2014 to 99% (2.04 GWh) by June 2018 Duration of outages for customersreduced by 20% in Auki by June 2018 compared to June 2014 CO2 emissions reduced by 1623 tCO2e by January 2018, relative to June 2014 baseline Diesel imports into Malaita Province for power generation reduced by 672,000 liters by March 2018 relative to June 2014 baseline | Not achieved. Renewable energy generation for Auki remains at 0%. Not monitored as project did not proceed Not achieved Not achieved |
Outputs 1. Fiu River Hydropower plant put into operation by SIEA | 2.04 GWh hydropower generated from the Fiu River Hydropower Plant per annum by June 2019 (2014 baseline 0.0 GWh) | Not achieved |
2. Extension of distribution grid by SIEA | SIEA increases household customers from 274 in June 2014 to 524 in June 2020 including subsidized connections to households headed by women Construction of additional 9.7 km distribution line by June 2020 (June 2014 baseline: 0km distribution line to Fiu River hydropower plant) SIEA increases commercial customers by 20% by February 2020 (baseline 335 in June 2014) | Not achieved Not achieved Not monitored as project did not proceed |
3. Capacity building undertaken for implementing agency and project beneficiaries | PMU conducts training workshops for 250 newly connected households including power safety, household utility budget and business skills (including 50% women participation) by June 2018 Minimum 6 SIEA staff receive | Not achieved Not achieved |
Appendix 1
Design Summary | Performance Indicators and Targets | Project Achievements |
| comprehensive training in hydropower operation by operation and maintenance contractors by September 2021 | |
4. The PMU renders efficient project management services | PMU meets annual target contract awards and disbursements PMU conducts training activities for PMU staff and SIEA management, including gender awareness training by June 2015 | Not achieved Not achieved |
ADB = Asian Development Bank, EPC = engineer-procure-construct, GWh = gigawatt-hour, MWh = megawatt-hour, O&M = operation and maintenance, PMU = Project Management Unit, SDR = special drawing right, SIEA = Solomon Islands Electricity Authority, tCO2e = tons carbon dioxide equivalent. Source: Asian Development Bank.